Robbery
in Blue
[This
is a companion piece to my earlier “Policing for Profit”. It examines another – and darker – side of
what happens when the goal of policing becomes dollars, not law enforcement.]
One
night in 1992 a gang of masked and armed men burst into Donald Scott’s ranch
house and shot him dead as he stood at the top of the stairs leading to his
bedroom. They were there to seize his
ranch. This armed gang was a mixed task
force from federal and state police agencies, including the park service, which
wanted the ranch for park land but were unable to buy it. Their search warrant stated that a helicopter
overflight had seen marijuana growing on the land, but as the subsequent law
suit revealed, a search of the ranch after the fatal raid found no marijuana.
A
young man in Florida was arrested and convicted for selling a small amount of
marijuana in a shopping center parking lot.
The pick-up he was driving was forfeited to the government … as was his
parent’s house. He lived in an apartment
on the rear of their house with its on separate entrance, although he did have
access to his parents’ kitchen. He used
the phone in that apartment, which was listed in his name, had arranged to have
installed, and paid for, to arrange the drug sale. The DEA claimed that this use of the phone
made the whole house an instrument of the crime even though the parents had no
access to it. The court held that the
parents could not be innocent owners since their son had been on probation for
marijuana possession when he was fifteen.
The judge said that the earlier probation put them on notice that he had
a propensity to deal drugs and that they should have taken greater steps to
insure he did not do so in their house.
A
Florida nurseryman flew to Houston to buy plants for his business from growers
in that area. Since many of those small
growers would not accept out of state checks, he withdrew $10,000 in cash to
use on the trip[1]. Federal agents met his plane when it landed
in Houston and he was arrested on suspicion of drug trafficking. His money was confiscated.
In
Dallas, a young man found a duffle bag full of money in the street. He did the right thing and turned the money
in to local authorities for return to the rightful owner. The DEA asserted a claim to the money on the
grounds that no one but a drug dealer would have that much cash. This story has a happy ending. The DEA’s claim was rejected and the money
was awarded to the honest finder. (This is one of my favorite stories.)
These
three stories are among the thousands of outcomes springing from one of the
most overreaching follies of Nixon’s tough-on-crime War on Drugs: civil asset
forfeiture. The FBI and BNDD (later the
DEA) had long been frustrated that they could rarely convict major crime
figures who only gave orders, never dirtying their own hands. The new laws[2] allowed then to seize any
property that they had probable cause to believe had been used as a criminal
instrumentality, was the proceeds of a crime, or had been acquired with
criminal proceeds. The government could
seize the property based only on probable cause (a very low standard of proof)
and the owner would be forced to file suit and prove by a preponderance of
evidence that he was an innocent owner.
These
laws not only severely weakened court oversight of the process, they also cut
administrative and political control of police behavior out of the
picture. The seized assets did not go
into general government funds subject to budgetary control and auditing; they
went directly to the police agency that had done the seizing for discretionary
use. Some police have made selfish use
of these slush funds. A prosecutor
bought a luxury automobile with expensive customizing for his “official”
car. A Texas sheriff threw monthly beer
and barbeque outings for his deputies. (How did local police get into the
act? First, the federal agencies shared
the loot with local agencies participating in the seizure, then most states
enacted “baby RICOs” of their own.
Not
all of the failures of these laws are as harmless as barbeque and pimped limos
or merely excessive like the forfeiture of a yacht valued at over a million
dollars because one marijuana cigarette butt was found in crew quarters. Most are downright destructive.
Ironically,
the law designed to punish the leaders of organized crime acted provided them a
safety net. Major drug lords discovered
they could exchange forfeiture of secret or untouchable off-shore millions for short,
easily served prison terms. Manuel
Noriega, corrupt drug-running Panamanian president bought a shorter sentence in
a minimum security prison than a street-corner dealer would serve in a maximum
security fortress. Informants became a
way of life for the police and flourishing businessmen in their own right; they
not only received direct pay for information, they also got shares in forfeited
property. Many DEA informants have
received over a million dollars each.[3]
Even
the patterns of law enforcement changed.
On the Interstate highways running north and south through Florida and
east and west through Arkansas, cars traveling north or east were rarely
stopped. They would be carrying drugs to
be sold that would have to be destroyed.
South- and west-bound cars were more attractive targets: they were carrying the proceeds of those
sales, money that the cops could confiscate.
In one Texas county, patrolmen were issued pre-printed release
forms. A motorist stopped in that county
with a large amount of cash could surrender the money, sign the release
acknowledging he was allowing the cop to take the money, and drive away without
being arrested.
These
corrupting laws need to be repealed. At
the very least, they should be amended to require the government to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt its right to take to take the property and for the recovery
of court costs and attorneys’ fees to the owner if the government does not
prevail. Any forfeited funds should go
into the government’s general funds, subject to budgeting controls, not
directly to the police.
In
the meantime, if an armed bandit pulls you out of your car and has a tow-truck
haul it away, or if you find yourself on the curb locked out of the house on
which you have been paying the mortgage for fifteen years, just take a deep
breath and smile. You haven’t been
robbed: the law says the cops have the right to grab it away from you.
Really great blog keep it up.
ReplyDeletedallas limo
dallas limousine
http://www.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/2013/11/12/federal-case-could-make-it-easier-for-victims-to-defend-themselves-against-civil-forfeiture/
ReplyDeleteFederal Case Could Make It Easier For Victims To Defend Themselves Against Civil Forfeiture
Op/Ed | 11/12/2013 @ 4:34PM
Nick Sibilla, Contributor
Without a search warrant, federal agents entered Robert Moser’s California home and seized $28,000 in currency. Under civil forfeiture, someone does not have to be convicted or charged with a crime to lose their property. But rather remarkably for a civil forfeiture case, Moser won his money back.
According to Judge Larry Alan Burns, who presided over the case, police committed “serial constitutional violations… [that] were purposeful and flagrant.” Moser was not informed of his Miranda rights nor did police obtain a warrant or his consent when they first entered his house. Due to this unlawful search and seizure, that $28,000 was returned to Moser.
...(much longer article)